Ukraine’s secret agents on enemy soil: How Russians are helping Zelensky strike Putin’s war machine

Russia-Ukraine War: Beyond the artillery smoke and muddy trenches lies a war fought in whispers. In a groundbreaking revelation, two Russian nationals have detailed their mission aiding Ukrainian military intelligence from both inside Russia and across Europe by cataloging troop movements, senior officers and high-value military targets. 

Produced by Polish investigative journalist Marcin Mamon for the BBC World Service, their testimonies reveal how covert networks operating across Russia are helping Ukraine gather intelligence on military targets and support operations against Putin’s war effort.

Identified in the documentary by assumed names, the men describe different roles in the operation. One says he helped prepare Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian military targets while living in the country. The other, who is now living in exile in Poland, says he manages volunteers who collect information on senior Russian military officers.

Ukraine’s military intelligence service, which is known as GUR, confirmed that the duo works with the agency. It also acknowledged that it may not have complete knowledge of their activities. The men disclosed limited details about their work, making it difficult to independently verify the operations they described.

From military surveillance to drone attacks

Referred to here as Ivan, the first man says his work included monitoring Russian military facilities and finding places where drone components could be concealed before an operation. He claims to have played a role in attacks targeting strategic bombers and ammunition factories on Russian soil.

His testimony shows the role of advance intelligence in preparing drone strikes on Russian territory. Knowing the location of military assets and identifying suitable places for equipment can help an operation reach targets far from Ukraine’s borders.

“When drone parts are assembled together... it becomes an extremely dangerous weapon that can destroy something worth hundreds of millions of dollars in a single strike,” Ivan said.

He told Mamon that he opposed both Russia’s war against Ukraine and Putin’s political leadership. He believes a Russian defeat could bring down the president’s rule.

“I think if Putin loses the war, his regime could fall... Through our actions, we are trying to speed up this process,” he said.

He also described the risks facing people who carry out covert work in Russia. If arrested, he said, they could face terrorism charges and spend decades in prison.

The testimonies follow Ukraine’s demonstration of its ability to strike Russian air bases far from the front line. In June 2025, Kyiv launched Operation Spider’s Web, using drones smuggled into Russia and concealed in wooden structures mounted on lorries. The operation targeted strategic aircraft at several Russian air bases.

Ukraine claimed extensive damage, while Moscow confirmed that some aircraft had been hit. The operation showed how advance preparation and access to locations in Russia could increase the reach of Ukrainian attacks.

An intelligence network tracking senior officers

Referred to as Foma in the documentary, the second man is a Russian living in exile in Poland. He says he runs a network of volunteers who monitor senior officers whom GUR may consider targets for future operations.

He says his network does not carry out attacks. Its role is to collect information that can help Ukrainian intelligence assess people and their movements. He claimed that he provided information about Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov before the Russian officer was killed in Moscow in December 2025.

Foma did not disclose the full list of people his network had monitored. He also said GUR identifies individuals for surveillance, while his team conducts its own checks before deciding whether to proceed.

A tutorial recorded by Mamon showed Foma explaining how volunteers receive information about a person they have been asked to monitor. He described files containing photographs, personal details and information about a vehicle, if the person owns one. He also instructed volunteers to avoid carrying their phones when approaching a target.

He said his network had around three dozen members spread across Russia, Ukraine and other parts of Europe. Those outside Russia provide logistical assistance, including tracking digital traces that could help establish information about potential targets.

He said his earlier connections with Russia’s elite gave him access to people who could provide inside information. He also showed Mamon a database containing locations of military storage facilities and units, as well as information about where senior officers and pilots of bombers used in attacks on Ukraine lived.

“To break the system, you have to understand how it works. Only then can you target its weak points,” he said.

How large is the network in Russia?

The number of Russian citizens involved in such work is difficult to establish. Foma estimates that between 300 and 500 people in the country may be carrying out similar activities for Ukraine, but the number could not be independently verified.

Ukraine has acknowledged using covert agents to support attacks against “legitimate” military targets in Russia. Its intelligence network has also cast shadow following a series of high-profile strikes on senior Russian commanders. Kyiv does not routinely accept official responsibility for targeted killings, although a Ukrainian intelligence official previously told the BBC that Ukraine was behind the December 2024 killing of Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov in Moscow.

The two men featured in Mamon’s documentary were careful about what they disclosed. When Ivan’s handler was asked whether he could be trusted, the response was, “I don’t trust anyone except myself.”

That caution shows the risks facing people operating in secret. Their testimonies offer a rare glimpse into the people helping Ukraine gather intelligence and prepare military operations deep inside Russia, although the specific activities they described could not be independently verified.